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Introduction 
 
 
The Japan-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
Economic Potentials and Policy Perspectives 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
At their summit on 6 July 2017, Japan and the EU reached an agreement in principle 
for bilateral free trade. The agreement should be ready for signing by the end of 2018. 
The intended liberalization of trade in goods, agriculture and services would create the 
world’s largest free trade area – assuming the agreement is successfully concluded and 
ratified by parliament. Japan and Europe are sending out a strong signal against pro-
tectionism and in favour of free trade and modernizing global trade rules. While free 
trade in the transatlantic and trans-Pacific context may remain an illusion for some 
time to come, the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) is a realistic op-
portunity for trade partners at the western and eastern margins of the Eurasian con-
tinent to achieve trade-induced growth and increased prosperity. Given its prominence, 
JEEPA raises the following questions: What trade liberalization can be expected? Does 
a free trade agreement between Japan and Europe actually make sense? Who would 
be the winners and losers? What are the risks and limitations? What are the political 
implications of the European-Japanese alliance? 
 
JEEPA is an example of a deep trade agree-
ment that goes far beyond mere trade in 
goods. The provisional agreement of 6 July 
includes a total of 16 negotiating points. In 
particular, the two parties agreed on better 
market access (tariff dismantling, reduction 
of non-tariff barriers to trade, liberalizing ser-
vice trade, opening up public procurement 
markets) and modernizing trade rules (e.g. 
rules of origin, intellectual property rights, 
technical barriers to trade, corporate gov-
ernance, competition, subsidies, state-owned 
enterprises, sustainability). Negotiations on 
investment and regulatory cooperation are 
still ongoing. While the content of invest-
ment protection (protection against unlaw-
ful expropriation, fair and equitable treat-
ment, national treatment, MFN treatment) 
has broadly been agreed, the controversial 
issue of investor-state arbitration has not. 
Better Market Access and 
Modernizing Trade Rules 
Tariff dismantling: Despite the EU and Japan 
already having relatively liberal customs 
SWP Comments 49 
November 2017 
2 
regimes, one of the most controversial 
negotiating areas was dismantling tariffs. 
Japan’s core demands for the duty-free export 
of motor vehicles, automotive parts and 
electronics were met by Europe’s demand 
for a liberalization of Japanese agricultural 
imports. On the European side, exporters of 
textiles, clothing, cosmetics and chemical 
products will also benefit. The outcome 
of the negotiations is that both sides have 
agreed to almost completely liberalize their 
bilateral trade, that is to say, between 97 and 
99 percent based on tariff lines and import 
volumes. Only tariffs on rice and seaweed 
remain in place. However, the transitional 
periods of up to 15 years extend far into the 
future. For example, Europe’s imports of 
motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts will 
only be fully duty-free after a transitional 
period of seven years. Japanese imports of 
leather goods and shoes will not be tariff-
free for another ten years. However, Japan 
will be able to import wine duty-free as 
soon as the agreement enters into force. But 
Japan envisages longer transitional periods 
until imports of tuna (five years), wood 
(seven years), chocolate, confectionery, 
pasta, pork (ten years) and cheese and beef 
(15 years) become fully or partially liberal-
ized. 
Non-tariff Trade Barriers (NTBs): The elimination 
or at least reduction of NTBs was a key Euro-
pean objective and was, therefore, nego-
tiated in parallel to dismantling tariffs. In 
the course of the negotiations, Japan has 
made “advance payments” already, for 
example by agreeing to substantially sim-
plify approval procedures and licensing of 
medical technology and to facilitate the 
establishment of foreign vehicle workshops. 
The Commission considers it an outstand-
ing negotiating success that Japan is willing 
to recognize UNECE international vehicle 
regulations, to remove all regulatory bar-
riers to market entry in the motor vehicle 
sector, to recognize European testing pro-
cedures and product standards for hydro-
gen-powered vehicles and to work together 
with Europe on setting international (auto-
motive) standards. In addition, Japan an-
nounced it would approve several food 
supplements and no longer treat imported 
beer from Europe as an alcoholic soft drink 
for tax and regulatory purposes, but to 
recognize it as beer. Japan also agreed to 
adopt international standards for textiles 
labelling and for the notification in the 
field of pharmaceuticals, medical devices 
and cosmetics. 
Services: On services, Japan and the EU 
have agreed on rational, transparent, non-
discriminatory rules that should improve 
mutual market access and limit regulatory 
discrimination without overriding national 
regulatory sovereignty. Specific agreements 
were made on telecommunications, finan-
cial services, insurance and postal and cou-
rier services. Explicit exceptions are basic 
public services, audiovisual services, mari-
time cabotage and some air transport. Both 
sides were largely able to agree on uniform 
standards in e-commerce. Importantly, the 
EU accommodated Japan’s wishes for visa 
facilitation for Japanese businessmen and 
their families. 
Public procurement: In addition to the WTO 
Public Procurement Agreement signed 
by both sides, the EU and Japan have also 
pledged to transparent, electronically 
supported tender specifications, mutually 
recognizing test results and selection cri-
teria and opening up procurement mar-
kets further by including hospitals, uni-
versities and all municipalities with more 
than 300,000 residents. In construction, 
Japan has agreed to fair tendering practices. 
National rail procurement markets are to 
be opened up on both sides, a key demand 
for both Germany and Europe. Explicitly 
included are Japan’s privatized rail opera-
tors (JR Central, JR East, JR West). Japan’s 
Operation Safety Clause on the procure-
ment of equipment, whose deliberately 
broad interpretation regularly led to Euro-
pean offers being disregarded, is to be lifted 
one year after the agreement comes into 
force. 
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Intellectual property rights: Since both Japan 
and the EU already have advanced intel-
lectual property systems in place, the agree-
ment only concerns improvements to indi-
vidual areas. For example, they have agreed 
on the protection of trade secrets and on 
advanced standards in patent protection 
for pharmaceutical products and crop pro-
tection. However, the EU was unable to 
secure copyright protection for musical 
works, in particular for sound recordings. 
Nevertheless, the Commission considered 
getting Japan to recognize geographic in-
dications on a total of 205 European agri-
cultural products and food products a 
considerable success. Once the agreement 
comes into force, they will be subject to 
trademark protection in Japan. 
Reviving Euro-Japanese trade 
Although Japan and Europe are important 
trading partners for each other, their 
mutual significance in both countries’ total 
trade has been declining. According to 
Eurostat, in 2016, Japan was the EU’s sixth 
largest trading partner after the US, China, 
Switzerland, Russia and Turkey with total 
exports worth 58.1 billion euros and total 
imports worth 66.4 billion euros. Germany 
accounted for around one quarter of all 
EU-28 trade. Conversely, the EU is propor-
tionately even more important for Japan as 
its third most prominent export destination 
(after China and the US) and its second most 
important source of imports (after China). 
However, both for Japan and Europe, the 
relative importance of their bilateral trade 
has been declining for several years. As a 
result, the share of EU exports to Japan 
in total EU exports fell from 6.2 percent 
(1990) to 3.1 percent (2015), while the share 
of EU imports from Japan in total EU im-
ports fell from 12.2 percent (1990) to 3.4 
percent (2015) (see Figure 1, p. 4). With over-
all higher initial levels, Europe’s share of 
Japanese exports fell from 20.8 percent 
(1990) to 10.2 percent (2015), and Europe’s 
share of Japanese imports decreased con-
siderably in the past two decades from 16.3 
percent (1990) to 10.4 percent (2015) (see 
Figure 2, p. 4). 
It seems evident, that a bilateral Japan-
EU free trade agreement could counteract 
the trend of bilateral trade integration 
and, in particular, offset the trade diversion 
effects of Japan’s and Europe’s agreements 
with third countries. In addition, there 
would be further trade potential in reduc-
ing tariffs, NTBs and other market access 
barriers. 
A positive assessment 
Following the agreement in principle from 
6 July, there is a good chance that JEEPA 
will expand and deepen trade and economic 
relations between the two partners. Japan 
and Europe are regions with a high per-
capita income, highly developed industrial 
and service industries and discerning con-
sumer markets. Both parties are committed 
to similar future areas such as digitization, 
interconnectivity, robotics, mobility, life 
science and energy efficiency. The potential 
for positive synergies and network effects 
is, therefore, significant. Even though JEEPA 
will only remove some of Japan’s market 
access barriers and will not meet all the 
liberalization demands of European busi-
ness, the FTA should increase intra-indus-
trial trade in goods and create new oppor-
tunities for cooperation between European 
and Japanese companies. The exchange of 
bilateral services and investment is likely to 
become broader and deeper and the growth 
climate should improve overall. Europe and 
Japan – geographically located on opposite 
margins of the Eurasian landmass – would 
converge economically, and perhaps socially 
and politically as well. 
Two pieces of empirical evidence support 
this optimistic assessment. Firstly, the dy-
namic development of trade between Korea 
and Europe after the bilateral (Korean-Euro-
pean) Free Trade Agreement came into 
force, illustrates how lifting trade barriers 
between two developed industrial regions 
can stimulate bilateral exchanges far 
beyond what is expected. Secondly, several  
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Figure 1 
Japanese share of EU-28 trade in goods (in percent) 
Non-EU trade. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade statistics, accessed 8 September 2016. 
Figure 2 
EU-28 share of Japan’s trade in goods (in percent) 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade statistics, accessed 8 September 2016. 
 
scientific studies and simulations compiled 
in the course of JEEPA negotiations (Copen-
hagen Economics, Ifo Institute for Econom-
ic Research, European Center for Inter-
national Political Economy) clearly indicate 
a positive impact on foreign trade and in-
come, although the orders of magnitude 
calculated are sometimes rather small. 
It is plausible to expect that a free trade 
agreement will benefit particularly those 
European countries already closely inter-
twined with Japan via exports, imports and 
direct investment. It is equally plausible 
to assume that a free trade agreement will 
primarily benefit those branches of indus-
try that are already well represented in the 
trading partner’s market. Consequently, 
Japan’s automotive, electrical engineering, 
electronics, mechanical engineering and 
fine chemicals industries can expect greater 
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exports to the EU, while the Europeans can 
look forward to expanding exports to Japan 
in the food production, automotive, chemi-
cal, pharmaceutical, medical, cosmetics, 
mechanical engineering and electrical 
engineering industries. By far the biggest 
beneficiary of dismantling tariffs and NTBs 
would be Europe’s agriculture and food 
manufacturing. The export profits resulting 
from the free trade agreement would, there-
fore, be relatively widespread throughout 
Europe, from north to south and east to west. 
Beyond the immediately foreseeable trade 
effects, Europe’s export industry would also 
be well positioned in a free trade agree-
ment to expand sales to Japan over the long 
term. In particular, this would serve the 
strategic interests of German industry in 
being well positioned to sell high-tech 
products in high-priced industrial markets. 
A steady increase of exports to Japan can be 
expected due to a variety of Japan-specific 
reasons, such as the country’s demographic 
change, dependence on imports, internation-
alization of its business culture and the 
stuttering but ongoing process of economic 
structural reforms. Furthermore, a bilateral 
agreement would have an indirectly posi-
tive impact on sales for Europe’s companies 
in third markets due to Japan’s extensive 
overseas presence and Japan’s continued 
pivotal role in Asia. 
In addition to new export opportunities, 
JEEPA might also benefit Europe’s econo-
mies through increased imports and direct 
investment from Japan. Firstly, reducing 
tariffs provides European consumers with 
real income gains which, in turn, indirectly 
create new income through additional 
expenditure. Secondly, importing high-
performance industrial components from 
Japan strengthens the qualitative competi-
tiveness of European companies. It is not 
widely known that, beyond large-scale in-
dustry, there are a large number of small 
and medium-sized companies operating in 
Japan with unique engineering and process 
expertise in their respective fields. Closer 
integration of this industrial culture, with 
its orientation towards technical perfec-
tion, into Europe’s entrepreneurial net-
works could increase the efficiency and 
competitiveness of Europe’s business. Third-
ly, JEEPA would make Europe more attrac-
tive to Japanese investors. To date, Japanese 
companies have been reluctant to invest in 
continental Europe compared to competing 
locations, such as the US, Asia and the UK. 
Fourthly, European interest in Japan’s tech-
nology, culture and everyday life has in-
creased in recent years. On the one hand, 
it is expected that Japanese goods will meet 
with broad demand and enrich Europe’s 
consumer culture – for example in the fields 
of food, living, design, accessories, horti-
culture, sports, comics, media and film. On 
the other hand, as a reference model, Japan 
is likely to stimulate European develop-
ment in digital networking and the roboti-
zation of the economy and society. 
Pitfalls and limitations 
The expected positive effects of JEEPA can-
not and should not obscure the limitations 
and risks of the intended trade integration. 
It is worth noting four critical points: 
Firstly, JEEPA knows not only winners 
but losers as well. This is because liberaliza-
tion will lead to displacement effects on 
both sides. In Europe, the automotive indus-
try will have to deal with tougher import 
competition from Japan as a result of re-
moving the ten-percent tariff. In Japan, 
the dismantling of agricultural tariffs will 
affect agriculture which is not a particularly 
competitive industry. The dairy industry, 
in particular, will face difficult structural 
adjustments. 
Secondly, JEEPA contains plenty of fuel 
for political and societal conflict. The free 
trade agreement could face opposition 
from civil society in Europe should inves-
tor-state arbitration tribunals be created or 
a kind of regulatory cooperation be agreed 
that might jeopardize the precautionary 
principle. It is feared that multinational 
corporations will benefit from special rights 
which would undermine consumer protec-
tion and could lead to a loss of national 
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regulatory sovereignty. Another criticism 
of the agreement is the low level of liability 
in its sustainability chapter, for example 
with regards to illegal logging imports from 
third countries. 
Thirdly, the agreements reached in JEEPA 
can only be a first step towards achieving 
better market access in Japan. Politics and 
industry must also ensure that its imple-
mentation is in line with the content and 
spirit of the agreement and that no new, 
currently unforeseen barriers to trade are 
created. A great deal of stamina will be 
needed to overcome opposition to Japan 
liberalizing its industry and agriculture 
since those lobbyists are well-connected in 
civil society, the governing party LDP and 
the ministries. 
Fourthly, even after JEEPA has come into 
force and been implemented, market access 
in Japan will still remain extremely diffi-
cult for European companies. Although 
JEEPA is expected to effectively dismantle 
import duties and NTBs in Japan, it will not 
overcome informal market barriers, that 
is, the specific socio-economic and socio-
cultural difficulties facing foreign suppliers 
in the Japanese market. Four special charac-
teristics of market access conditions are 
critical in Japan. 
Firstly, it is extremely difficult for for-
eign newcomers to adapt to Japanese busi-
ness culture. Actors need to be extremely 
proficient in writing and speaking Japanese 
and must be prepared to spend a lot of time 
and money establishing and maintaining 
business contacts. Products must be tai-
lored to the specific needs of the Japanese 
market and it is important to meet con-
sumers’ demands for extremely high qual-
ity and service. The Japanese domestic 
market is dominated by fierce and intense 
competition not only on price, but also 
on quality and service. In general, Japan’s 
economic relations – both inside and out-
side companies – are more long-term than 
in other markets. Newcomers must, there-
fore, invest a considerable amount of time 
and financial resources if they want to 
break into existing business relationships. 
As a rule, foreign newcomers can only suc-
ceed if they have a decisive advantage in 
price-performance ratio or a convincing 
product innovation. Secondly, there is a 
distinct insider culture in Japan’s economy 
and society. It is very difficult for foreigners 
to find acceptance because of the pressure 
to adapt and conform and the closed nature 
of Japanese society. They are always treated 
as outsiders. Thirdly, the Japanese legal sys-
tem and legal practice tend to discriminate 
against foreign companies (generally out-
siders or the economically weaker party). 
For example, in Japanese legal practice, 
companies are often denied legal remedies 
or are restricted in their ability to respond 
to contract infringements, infringements 
on immaterial property rights, unfair com-
petition, bidding cartels or government 
discrimination. Fourthly, companies must 
take into account high market-entry and 
operational costs, not least because of the 
market access barriers mentioned above. In 
addition, there are high prices for land and 
property, considerable sales and distribution 
costs and top tax rates of more than 50 per-
cent – all in a stagnant domestic market. The 
result is that investments in Japan promise 
lower returns and lower growth rates than 
alternative investments in other markets. 
An obvious consequence of informal mar-
ket barriers is the below-average integration 
of Japan into the global economic division 
of labour. In overall economic terms, im-
ports, exports and direct investment are sur-
prisingly low in Japan. Japan is only slowly 
getting closer to the structures of compa-
rably large economies and trading nations. 
One striking example is that Japan’s imports 
make up only 15.2 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP), compared to Germany (31.4 
percent), France (26.9 percent) and South 
Korea (31.7 percent). In no other industrial-
ized country do industrial imports play such 
a minor role in domestic market supply as 
they do in Japan. This is reflected in the un-
usually low share of imported industrial 
goods to GDP (which excludes quantitatively 
significant imports of energy, raw materials 
and agricultural products) (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 
Share of imported industrial goods to GDP, Japan compared to Germany,  
South Korea and the US* 
* SITC 5 to 8 without 667 and 68. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; UN, UN Comtrade Database; 
UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (accessed 20 October 2016). 
 
The share of foreign direct investment to 
Japanese GDP is also exceptionally low, at 
just 3.7 percent in 2015. By contrast, China’s 
corresponding share was 10.8 percent, 
South Korea 12.9 percent, Germany 19.3 
percent, France 25.6 percent, the US 30.9 
percent and the UK 56.4 percent. Clearly, 
investing in the market, for example by 
constructing a local production site, selling 
services or acquiring a local business, is 
much more difficult and unprofitable in 
Japan than elsewhere. 
Informal barriers to trade cannot really 
be overcome by a free trade agreement. This 
would require a change in business culture, 
mentality and consumer behaviour as well 
as long-term structural reforms. However, 
such factors are not the subject of free trade 
agreements. Nevertheless, ongoing efforts 
in Japan to implement structural reforms 
and internationalize business culture have 
led to an improved business environment 
for foreign companies. However, at best, 
JEEPA can only support this process. 
Foreign policy perspectives 
Beyond trade policy, JEEPA also has a politi-
cal dimension. In addition to the free trade 
agreement, Japan and Europe are also nego-
tiating a strategic partnership agreement 
for political, global and sectoral cooperation. 
The fact that Japan and Europe are conduct-
ing negotiations to deepen and intensify 
relations in the two key areas of external 
relations – trade and foreign policy – has 
political significance. It documents that 
both sides are seeking closer political co-
operation extending beyond holding regu-
lar summit meetings and cooperating 
politically on peripheral fields of foreign 
policy. It shows the political will to counter-
act economic disintegration and the loss of 
political substance in the bilateral relation-
ship. The aim is to intensify cooperation 
which would benefit both sides economi-
cally and politically. 
In a globally fragile security environ-
ment, Japan and the EU are endorsing 
each other as reliable partners with shared 
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values. Both sides are aware they need 
to take more responsibility in the world. 
While uncertainty has increased in the 
fields of trade and security policy during 
the Trump administration’s first year in 
office, the chances and potential for closer 
EU-Japan cooperation are considerable. A 
joint commitment to preserving the rule-
based, liberal world order, supported by 
ever closer economic integration, would 
give real substance and focus to the Japa-
nese-European partnership. It seems that 
Japanese-European relations are entering a 
strategic dimension in the current era of 
uncertainty in which authoritarian rule, 
transactional politics and unilateral action 
are taking hold. 
Outlook and conclusions 
Japan is opening up to foreign trade and is 
slowly adjusting its import structure in line 
with other OECD countries. This process 
is mainly due to internal developments in 
Japan itself, but is effectively supported by 
liberalizing trade policy. Japan is undergo-
ing an internationalization of its business 
culture. Structural reforms eliminate 
market barriers and discrimination and the 
ageing demographic of its society is result-
ing in an increased dependency on imports. 
The intended dismantling of tariffs and 
NTBs as part of JEEPA will give European 
companies the opportunity to participate 
in these processes taking place in Japan, 
thereby counteracting recent creeping 
losses in market share. By the same token, 
Europe can also benefit from cheap, versa-
tile product offers from Japan. In macroe-
conomic terms, Europe can expect in-
creased trade, investment, production and 
income, as well as additional stimuli for 
innovation and competition. It is in both 
Europe’s and Japan’s interests to liberalize 
bilateral trade and investment with a far-
reaching free trade agreement with high 
mandatory standards. And the method 
of its implementation will be important. 
Politically, the proposed Euro-Japanese 
free trade agreement is a clear sign in 
favour of a rule-based liberal world order 
and against trade protectionism. The free 
trade agreement and the partnership agree-
ment negotiated at the same time could be 
the starting point for closer cooperation on 
trade, foreign policy and security between 
the two sides. European-Japanese relations 
can achieve greater substance and liability 
from this alliance. It can strengthen Europe’s 
political profile in Asia, and Japan’s in 
Europe. 
On regulatory issues, the EU and Japan 
are natural partners as they pursue similar 
philosophies. Cooperation should, there-
fore, be easier than with the US. The trade 
rules agreed in the FTA, such as on sustain-
ability, property rights, industrial standard 
regulation, competition and procurement, 
should serve as the basis for future trade 
agreements with third countries and be-
come a joint position that both sides repre-
sent in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
If the Trump administration attempts to 
isolate the US import market by means of 
arbitrary commercial measures or even dis-
regards the authority of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism, the EU and Japan 
should act together and oppose such meas-
ures jointly instead of acting in isolation. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2017 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by Martin Haynes 
This SWP Comment is based 
on the findings of a longer 
study, published in German 
as SWP-Studie 15/2017: 
“Japans multiple Handels-
politik. Die Chancen des 
europäisch-japanischen 
Freihandelsabkommens”, 
July 2017. 
